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Parkinson's disease (PD) is traditionally conceptualised as a disorder of movement, but
recent data suggest that motivational deficits may be more pervasive than previously
thought. Here, we ask whether subclinical deficits in incentivised decision-making are
present in PD and, if so, whether dopaminergic therapy ameliorates such deficits. We
devised a novel paradigm in which participants decided whether they were willing to
squeeze a hand-held dynamometer at varying levels of force for different magnitudes of
reward. For each participant, we estimated the effort level at which the probability of
accepting a reward was 50% e the effort ‘indifference point’. Patients with PD (N ¼ 26) were
tested ON and OFF their usual dopaminergic medication, and their performance compared
to those of age-matched controls (N ¼ 26). No participant was clinically apathetic as defined
by the Lille Apathy Rating Scale (LARS). Our data show that, regardless of medication
status, patients with PD chose to engage less effort than controls for the lowest reward.
Overall, however, dopamine had a motivating effect on participants' choice behaviour e
patients with PD chose to invest more effort for a given reward when they were in the ON
relative to OFF dopamine state. Importantly, this effect could not be attributed to motor
facilitation. We conclude that deficits in incentivised decision-making are present in PD
even in the absence of a clinical syndrome of apathy when rewards are low, but that
dopamine acts to eliminate motivational deficits by promoting the allocation of effort.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).oCA, Montreal Cognitive Assessment; LARS, Lille Apathy Rating Scale; DASS, Depression
on's Disease Rating Scale; LE, Levodopa equivalence; MVC, Maximal Voluntary Contraction;
t of Clinical Neurosciences, John Radcliffe Hospital, Oxford OX3 9DU, United Kingdom.
.uk (T.T.-J. Chong).
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Parkinson's disease (PD) is a prototypical model of striatal
dysfunction. The accompanying dopaminergic depletion is
traditionally considered one of the underlying mechanisms
that contributes to the cardinal motor symptoms of bradyki-
nesia, rigidity and tremor (Jankovic, 2008). Recently, however,
some authors have proposed that at least some Parkinsonian
motor symptoms may represent a deficit in ‘implicit’ motor
motivation. For example, one study reported that patients
with PD had similar kinematic parameters to controls, but
were more likely to move slowly when the energetic demands
of a movement increased (Mazzoni, Hristova, & Krakauer,
2007). They therefore conceptualised Parkinsonian bradyki-
nesia as a shift in the balance between the perceived reward of
reaching the target endpoint and the amount of effort required
to achieve amovement of normal speed. Findings such as this
suggest that motivational deficits may be more pervasive in
PD than previously thought.
To determine if an action is worth initiating, one must
evaluate the cost of that action e for example, the effort
associated with it e against its potential rewards. Effort is
generally considered aversive and, when given a choice,
most animals will usually prefer actions that are less
effortful (Salamone, Correa, Farrar, & Mingote, 2007; Walton,
Kennerly, Bannerman, Phillips, & Rushworth, 2006). Thus,
rewards which require less effort are generally preferred
over rewards of identical value which are associated with
greater effort (Hull, 1943). A number of animal studies have
implicated dopamine in effort and reward valuation
(Pasquereau & Turner, 2013). In rats, dopamine depletion
decreases tolerance for effort, while drugs enhancing dopa-
mine have the reverse effect (Salamone & Correa, 2002;
Salamone et al., 2007). Human data regarding the involve-
ment of dopamine on effort and reward integration remain
relatively scarce, although there is a growing interest to-
wards understanding the role of dopamine in cost-benefit
integration (Frank, 2005; Wardle, Treadway, Mayo, Zald, &
de Wit, 2011).
The pathognomonic striatal dysfunction in PD makes it an
excellentmodelwithwhich to study the effect of dopamine on
incentivised decision-making in humans. It remains poorly
understood how PD affects the valuation of an action's costs
and benefits, and how that may subsequently affect choice
behaviour. Although several studies in PD have examined
impairments in decision-making and reward (e.g., Bodi et al.,
2009; Cools, Barker, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2003; Czernecki
et al., 2002; Frank, Seeberger, & O'Reilly, 2004; Mimura, Oeda,
& Kawamura, 2006; Porat, Hassin-Baer, Cohen, Markus, &
Tomer, 2014), relatively few have explicitly examined effort-
based motivational deficits (e.g., Porat et al., 2014; Schmidt
et al., 2008). Given the large animal literature postulating the
role of striatal dopamine in incentivisation, we hypothesise
that motivational deficits are likely present at least subclini-
cally in PD, and independent of a clinical syndrome of apathy
in which amotivation is a defining characteristic (Pluck &
Brown, 2002). Moreover, we predict that dopamine should
ameliorate these motivational deficits by promoting the allo-
cation of effort.Here, we report the results of a novel paradigm in which
participants decided whether to accept or reject a potential
reward based on the effort that would be required to obtain it.
An important feature of our design was that it allowed us to
focus on the effects of dopamine on participants' choices. This
contrasts with many previous studies, especially those in
animals, which have inferred the motivational effects of
dopamine on behaviour by examining the effort manifest in
the actions themselves (see Salamone et al., 2007 for review).
By analysing participants' choices, we were able to calculate
for each stake the effort level at which participants considered
an action not worth pursuing e their ‘effort indifference
points.’ We could then quantify the effect of PD and dopa-
minergic medication on shifting the position of these indif-
ference points relative to healthy controls.2. Material and methods
2.1. Participants
This study was approved by the local institutional review
board, and patients did not receive financial compensation for
their participation in the study. Patients with PD were
recruited through a tertiary hospital and community support
groups. All patients were reviewed by at least two consultant
neurologists (TC and one other), and had a confirmed diag-
nosis of idiopathic PD. They were excluded if they had a his-
tory of stroke, depression, impulse control disorder, cognitive
impairment [Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) score
<26/30] or musculoskeletal disease that would have interfered
with their ability to perform our task. Patients were on
levodopa-containing compounds (n ¼ 10), dopamine agonists
(n ¼ 5, including pramipexole, ropinirole, rotigotine), or com-
binations of both (n ¼ 11). Clinical severity was assessed with
the Unified Parkinson's Disease Rating Scale (UPDRS) (Fahn
et al., 1987). We screened for apathy and depression with the
Lille Apathy Rating Scale (LARS) (Sockeel et al., 2006) and
Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS) (Brown, Korotitsch,
Chorpita, & Barlow, 1997; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995),
respectively. Table 1 summarises the characteristics of our
final sample of 26 patients. An equal number of age- and
education-matched controls was recruited through the local
participant pool. Control participants were excluded if they
had a history of neurological illness, but exclusion criteria
were otherwise identical to those for patients.2.2. Method
Participants were seated in front of a computer running Psy-
chtoolbox (http://psychtoolbox.org) implemented in Matlab
(MathWorks, USA). They registered their responses using two
hand-held dynamometers (SS25LA, BIOPAC Systems, USA).
At the beginning of each session, the dynamometers were
calibrated to each participant's maximal voluntary contrac-
tion (MVC). Participants alternately squeezed the left and
right dynamometers as strongly as possible, and the
maximum contraction reached over three trials was taken as
each participant's MVC for that hand. This procedure
Table 1 e Summary of participant demographics (means ± SD).
Patients with PD Healthy controls Group difference
N 26 26 e
Age (years) 66.6 (±6.8) 66.2 (±6.4) t(50) ¼ .23, p ¼ .82
Gender (M:F) 17:9 15:11 c2 ¼ .08, p ¼ .78
LARSa 28 (±4.2) 29 (±5.7) U ¼ 277, p ¼ .23
Depression Score on DASSb 2.00 (±2.23) 1.5 (±1.84) U ¼ 295, p ¼ .41
MoCA Scoresc 28.2 (±1.3) 28.2 (±1.7) t(50) ¼ .09, p ¼ .93
UPDRS III (ON, OFF)d ON: 21.6 (±11.7)
OFF: 31.9 (±13.6)
N/A e
Hoehn & Yahr Staged 1.85 (±.54) N/A e
Disease duration (years) 5.1 (±3.1) N/A e
Levodopa equivalence (mg)e 538 (±275) N/A e
Interval between sessions (days) 7.8 (±1.7) 7.2 (±.8) t(50) ¼ 1.51, p ¼ .14
Average time since last dose (hours) ON: 2.28 (±.97)
OFF: 13.4 (±3.4)
N/A e
a Normal range < 16 (Sockeel et al., 2006).
b Normal range ¼ 0e9 (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995).
c MoCA normal range 26e30.
d Clinical severity was assessed with the motor section (Part III, items 18e31) of the Unified Parkinson's Disease Rating Scale
(UPDRS) (Fahn et al., 1987) and the modified Hoehn and Yahr scale. See Supplementary Table 1 for a full summary of patients'
UPDRS data.
e Levodopa equivalence (LE) scores were calculated based on standard formulae (Tomlinson et al., 2010). Patients were on
levodopa-containing compounds (n ¼ 10), dopamine agonists (n ¼ 5), or combinations of both (n ¼ 11).
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maximum force.
During the experiment, participants were presented with
cartoons of apple trees, and were instructed to accumulate as
many apples as possible based on the combinations of stake
and effort that were presented (Fig. 1). Potential rewards were
indicated by the number of apples on the tree (1, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15),
while the associated effort was indicated by the height of a
yellow bar positioned on the tree trunk, and ranged over six
levels as a function of participants'MVCs (60%, 70%, 80%, 90%,
100%, 110%). By referencing the effort levels in each session to
each individual's maximum force, we were able to normalise
the difficulty of each level across sessions and across in-
dividuals. Participants were familiarised with the effort
required for each level prior to commencing the experiment.
On each trial, participants had to decidewhether theywere
willing to exert the specified level of effort for the specified
stake. If they judged the particular combination of stake and
effort to be ‘not worth it,’ they selected the ‘No’ response, and
the next trial would commence. If, however, they decided to
engage in that trial, they selected the ‘Yes’ option. The tree
would subsequently reappear on the left or right of the screen
(selected at random), corresponding to the hand to be used for
response execution. Participants then had five seconds to
squeeze the dynamometer to reach the target effort level.
Apples could only be acquired if the target effort level was
reached; if participants failed to do so, no apples were
received. If they rejected a particular combination of effort
and reward, they were instructed that a different tree would
subsequently appear and they were to proceed with the same
process. At the conclusion of the trial, they received feedback
on their performance. Combinations of stake and effort were
presented according to an adaptive staircase algorithm (see
Supplementary Material).After an initial practice block of 36 trials, participants
completed five experimental blocks of 36 trials, separated by
rest breaks. They were tested in two sessions approximately
one week apart. In one (‘ON’) session, patients were tested
while taking their usual dopaminergic medication; and, in the
other (‘OFF’), patients were tested after overnight withdrawal
of medication. The order of ON and OFF sessions was coun-
terbalanced across patients. Control participants performed
two identical sessions to exclude the possibility of strategic
changes across sessions.3. Results
For each stake, we estimated the effort level at which the
probability of accepting an offer was 50% (i.e., the effort
‘indifference point’). For each participant, we fitted a logistic
function to the choice probability data at each effort level
(Fig. 2). The effort indifference points thus derived for each
participant were then plotted against their corresponding
stake magnitudes. We then compared the effort indifference
points for PD ON, PD OFF and controls with repeated-
measures ANOVAs.
3.1. Control data
First, we ensured that control performance did not differ
across testing sessions (Fig. 3). A repeated-measures ANOVA
on effort indifference points with the factors of Session (First,
Second) and Stake (Levels 1e6) showed a significant main ef-
fect of Stake [F(5, 125) ¼ 47.90, p < .001], with Bonferroni-
corrected contrasts revealing significant differences at each
successive Stake Level (all p < .05). Importantly, neither the
main effect of Session [F(1, 25) ¼ .59] nor its interaction with
Fig. 1 e Summary of a typical trial. Stakes were indicated by
the number of apples on the tree (1, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15), while the
associated effort was indicated by the height of a yellow bar
positionedatoneofsixlevelsonthetree trunk(corresponding
to MVCs of 60%, 70%, 80%, 90%, 100%, 110%). On each trial,
participants decided whether theywere willing to exert the
specified level of effort for the specified stake. If they judged
theparticular combinationof stake and effort to be ‘notworth
it,’ they selected the ‘No’ response. If, however, they decided
to engage in that trial, they selected the ‘Yes’ response, and
then had to squeeze a hand-held dynamometer with a force
sufficient to reach the target effort level. Participants received
visual feedback of their performance, as indicated by the
height of a red force feedback bar. To reduce the effect of
fatigue, participants were only required to squeeze the
dynamometers on 50%of accepted trials. At the conclusion of
each trial, participantswere provided with feedback on the
number of apples gathered.
Fig. 2 e An example of the fitted probability functions for a
representative participant. Logistic functions were used to
plot the probability of engaging in a trial as a function of
the effort level for each of the six stakes. Each participant's
effort indifference points e the effort level at which the
probability of engaging in a trial for a given stake is 50%
(indicated by the dashed line) e were then computed.
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ences in control performance across Sessions 1 and 2. We
therefore collapsed the control data across the two sessions
for subsequent analyses.
3.2. Patient data e ON versus OFF
To compare the effect of drug on effort indifference points, we
performed a similar two-way repeated-measures ANOVA,
with the factors of Drug (ON, OFF) and Stake (1e6) (Fig. 4A).
This revealed a significant main effect of Drug, F(1, 25) ¼ 25.9,Fig. 3 e Effort indifference points plotted as a function of
stake for healthy controls in Sessions 1 and 2. Effort
indifference points divide the stake-effort space into a
sector in which participants are willing to engage in an
effortful response (below the curve) from a sector that is
judged ‘not worth the effort’ (above the curve). Control
performance was identical between sessions 1 and 2. Error
bars indicate ±1 SEM.
Fig. 4 e Effort indifference points plotted as a function of stake for patients and controls. (A) Regardless of medication status,
patients had significantly lower effort indifference points than controls for the lowest reward. However, for high rewards,
effort indifference points were significantly higher for patients when they were ON medication, relative not only to when
they were OFF medication, but even compared to healthy controls. Inset: For clarity, PD data are replotted against control
performance for patients (B) ONmedication and (C) OFF medication. Shading denotes effort indifference points being greater
for patients than controls (orange), or less for patients than controls (yellow). Error bars indicate ±1 SEM.
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invest more effort than those OFF, as reflected by a higher
mean effort indifference point (M 4.34 ± SE .10 vs 3.89 ± .13).
The main effect of Stake was also significant, F(5, 125) ¼ 111.2,
p < .001, with Bonferroni-corrected contrasts demonstrating
significant differences between all pairings of Stake (p < .001).
The interaction between Drug and Stake was not significant
[F(5, 125) ¼ 1.26].
To determine if maximal force output was modulated by
dopamine, we compared MVCs ON and OFF medication.
Importantly, they were not significantly different [OFF
354 ± 24N vs ON 360 ± 23N, t(25) ¼ 1.34]. There was also no
significant effect of time-on-task, which we used to examine
the effect of fatigue on motor performance (see
Supplementary Material). Furthermore, there was no corre-
lation between shifts in effort indifference points and im-
provements in motor severity on the motor subscale (Part III)
of the UPDRS (r ¼ .22, p ¼ .28; see Supplementary Material).
Thus, the shift of effort indifference points ON medication
was not simply attributable to a capacity to exert greater force
or reductions in motor severity.
Given the association between dopamine and impulse
control disorders (Weintraub et al., 2010), could the incenti-
vising effect of dopamine be mediated by lower risk aversion?
We analysed the proportion of trials in which patients
engaged in effort levels beyond their capacity to perform (i.e.,
Effort Level 6, or 110% MVC). Importantly, there was no sig-
nificant difference in this parameter ON versus OFF medica-
tion [t(25) ¼ 1.59]. Furthermore, there was no effect of drug
on the proportion of accepted trials in which patients failed
to reach the target effort level [t(25) ¼ .17], and no effect ofdrug on failure rates or trial history (see Supplementary
Material).
3.3. Patient versus control data
Next, we compared patient performance ON medication with
that of controls (Fig. 4B). An ANOVA showed a significant ef-
fect of Stake [F(5, 250) ¼ 106.96, p < .001] but not of Group,
which was qualified by a significant interaction [F(5,
250) ¼ 9.62, p < .001]. Patients ON dopamine invested less
effort than controls for the lowest Stake (2.42 ± .24 vs
3.19 ± .19, p < .05). However, quite the opposite was found for
higher Stakes (levels 4e6), at which controls were actually
willing to exert less effort than patients ONmedication (Stake
Level 4, ON 4.89 ± .11 vs Control 4.40 ± .11, p < .005; Level 5, ON
5.05 ± .12 vs Control 4.62 ± .12, p < .05; Level 6, ON 5.26 ± .13 vs
Control 4.75 ± .13, p < .01). Notably, there was no significant
difference in MVCs between patients ON medication and
controls [Patients 360 ± 23N vs Controls 350 ± 24N, t(50) ¼ .31].
For patient performance OFF medication versus controls
(Fig. 4C), the analogous ANOVA demonstrated a significant
effect of Stake [F(5, 250) ¼ 111.90, p < .001], with a non-
significant main effect of Group [F(1, 50) ¼ 2.70]. Again, the
two-way interaction was significant [F(5, 250) ¼ 6.12, p < .001],
with Bonferroni-corrected comparisons revealing that pa-
tients OFF medication were willing to expend less effort than
controls, but only for the lowest two stakes (Stake Level 1, OFF
2.31 ± .21 vs Control 3.19 ± .19, p < .005; Level 2, 3.33 ± .16 vs
3.80 ± .16, p < .05). MVCs between patients OFFmedication and
controls were not significantly different [Patients 354 ± 23N vs
Controls 350 ± 24N, t(50) ¼ .129].
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Few studies to date have examined impairments in effort-
based decision-making in PD (e.g., Porat et al., 2014;
Schmidt et al., 2008). Our data reveal two key findings. First,
patients with PD, regardless of medication status, were
willing to invest less effort than their healthy counterparts
for the lowest reward. Second, dopamine exerted a moti-
vating influence on choice behaviour. Specifically, patients
with PD chose to invest more effort for a given stake when
they were ON medication relative to OFF. Importantly, the
incentivising effect of dopamine cannot simply be due to
motor facilitation, as there were no significant differences in
MVC across drug session, or between patients and controls.
Furthermore, the shift in effort indifference points from OFF
to ON was not correlated with improvements in clinical
motor severity as measured by the motor section of the
UPDRS.
A notable feature of our paradigm, and one of its significant
strengths, is that it allowed us to dissect out choice behaviour
from motor preparation and execution. Many studies, in
particular those in animals, infer the effect of dopamine on
effort by observing the effort manifest in the behaviour itself
(see Salamone et al., 2007 for review). A recent study in
healthy adults, for example, reported that dopamine aug-
ments response vigour in proportion to average reward rate
(Beierholm et al., 2013). In contrast to these previous studies,
however, our paradigm demonstrates that the incentivising
effect of dopamine is evident even during choice behaviour e
i.e., prior to an action being initiated.
The question of how dopamine modulates aberrant cost-
benefit integration in PD has not been extensively explored.
The finding that patients ON medication were willing to exert
greater force relative to OFF supports animal data showing
that increasing dopaminergic tone enables high-effort be-
haviours and increases tolerance of effort expenditure
(Cagniard et al., 2006; Niv, Daw, Joel, & Dayan, 2007; Robbins&
Everitt, 1992; Wardle et al., 2011). Critically, this incentivising
effect of dopamine is independent of any motor changes
whichmight have occurred between the OFF and ON sessions.
This is an important consideration, given that a recent study
in PD found that the greater number of key-presses that pa-
tients exerted for reward when medicated was related to an
improvement in their motor symptoms (Porat et al., 2014). Our
study builds on these previous findings by showing that the
motivational effect of dopamine on effort-based choices can
occur independent of motor facilitation, as measured by either
motor strength (MVC) or the clinical severity of motor signs
(UPDRS).
Studies of disordered motivation in PD often focus on
clinically apathetic patients (e.g., Dujardin et al., 2007). Here,
we show that patients with PD, who were neither clinically
apathetic nor depressed, and regardless of medication status,
were less motivated than controls to invest effort when the
rewards were low. This confirms that Parkinsonian striatal
dysfunction is sufficient to cause an imbalance in the esti-
mation of an action's expected value, and is consistent with
animal studies showing that dopamine antagonism ordepletion reduces willingness to work for reward (Salamone
et al., 2007). Although we only found a reduction in motiva-
tion for the lowest levels of reward, any potential differences
at higher stakes in the comparison of PD OFF versus controls
could very well have been obscured by a saturation effect at
the highest levels of effort. It should also be noted that our
finding of lower effort indifference points in patients versus
controls for low stakes occurred despite the LARS scores be-
tween the two groups being statistically similar and within
the normal range. This result therefore emphasises that
motivational deficits may be present subclinically in PD for
low rewards, but that they are detectable with a sufficiently
sensitive measure.
Finally, it is worth considering why participants in our
task may have been willing to trade effort for fictive re-
wards. There is of course a considerable literature that
supports the view that effort carries a value cost, and dis-
counts the subjective value of potential rewards (e.g.,
Botvinick, Huffstetler, & McGuire, 2009). Complementing this
literature is a considerable volume of evidence showing that
real and fictive rewards are discounted similarly in behav-
ioural paradigms (Hinvest & Anderson, 2010; Madden,
Begotka, Raiff, & Kastern, 2003; Matusiewicz, Carter,
Landes, & Yi, 2013). Furthermore, fMRI studies have shown
that real and fictive rewards recruit overlapping neural re-
gions (Bickel, Pitcock, Yi, & Angtuaco, 2009). In light of these
findings, we therefore expected our participants to discount
effort even in the presence of fictive rewards, as they in fact
ultimately did.
Together, our findings show that deficits in incentivised
decision-making are present in PDwhen rewards are low even
in the absence of a clinical syndrome of apathy, but that
dopamine acts to ameliorate motivational deficits by pro-
moting the allocation of effort. This echoes recent reports that
Parkinsonian movement shares many attributes with healthy
behaviour (Desmurget et al., 2004), with a reducedmotor drive
being central to certain Parkinsonian motor symptoms
(Kojovic et al., 2014; Mazzoni et al., 2007). The pervasiveness of
motivational impairments in PD invites reconsideration of the
degree to which Parkinsonian hypokinesia is due simply to
motor dysfunction versus a primary motivational deficit.
These contributions are not mutually exclusive, and both
might be important in determining the surfacemanifestations
of dopaminergic deficits in PD.
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